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Abstract
This study proposes a dynamic model of rebellion, where three players in-
dividually decide to challenge their common adversary. It is formally demon-
strated that the pattern of rebellion is determined endogenously, depending on
the challengersresolve and strength. In other words, a stronger challenger with
more resolve tends to ght earlier than others do. (JEL: D74; F51)
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1 Introduction
While some scholars regard rebellion as a coordination game, where rebels strive to
synchronize their challenges (Granovetter 1978; Weingast 1995, 1997, 2005; Angeletos,
Hellwig, and Pavan 2007; Fearon 2011), others presume a rebellion occurs in an
uncoordinated manner, where a leader (vanguard) tries to mobilize opportunistic
followers (Roemer 1985; Ginkel and Smith 1999; Bueno de Mesquita 2010). These
two distinct approaches have contrasting implications according to the former, a
rebellion breaks out with simultaneous challenges, while the latter suggests a rebellion
escalates gradually with sequential challenges.
This theoretical discrepancy is reconciled by Nakao (2015), who endogenized the
sequence and timing of challenges in order to demonstrate that a rebellion can oc-
cur in either a coordinated or an uncoordinated manner in light of two challengers,
depending on their resolve and strength. However, his analysis with more than two
challengers remains informal. In extending his model by incorporating three chal-
lengers, this study formally analyzes four patterns of rebellion: (i) snowballing re-
bellion, which escalates gradually as more challengers are drawn in (e.g., Napoleonic
Wars); (ii) catalytic rebellion, in which an instigator provokes a galvanizing event to
inspire all others simultaneous challenges (Boshin War); (iii) partially coordinated
rebellion, which is initiated by a few of the ex post challengers (American Civil War);
(iv) fully coordinated rebellion, in which all the challengers ght in unison (American
Revolution). By delivering the condition for each of the patterns, we show that among
three challengers, a stronger challenger with more resolve tends to ght earlier than
others do. Even with more than three challengers, a rebellion can still be categorized
into one of these four patterns.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and its
assumptions are shown in Section 3. Section 4 portrays four patterns of rebellion.
Sections 5 and 6 analyze the playersbehavior and solve the model. Section 7 o¤ers
numerical example. Section 8 concludes.
2 A Model with Three Challengers
In the model, there are three players (i; j 2 f; ; g with i 6= j), who are discontented
with their government. In the rst period t = 1, each player decides to ght or
acquiesceto the government. In addition, in subsequent periods t = 2; 3; : : : ; any
player who has not yet fought the government decides whether or not to ght. If
player i chooses to ght, inicting a lump-sum cost ci > 0, the battle results in one of
is win,holdout,and lossin that period, depending on the governments (later
specied) military strength G relative to the rebels. If i wins (loses), the war
ends with is one-o¤ gain wi > 0 (loss li > 0). If i holds out in a battle, the war
continues to the next period. The payo¤ from acquiesceis normalized to zero.
Once a player starts ghting, he cannot withdraw its army, and the battle evolves
until the player winsor losesthe war. In other words, a players decision is when
to ght or permanently acquiesce. On the other hand, the government is assumed
not to make any strategic decision. The game continues until every players battle
ends decisively with winor loss.
The model captures the uncertainty of the governments strength. The players
do not know the governments true strength g, which is binary: weak or strong (g
2 fgW ; gSg with 0 < gW < gS), but they know the prior probability distribution of
the governments strength Pr(g). Each player i is given a parameter ri > 0, which
denotes is strength. A battle outcome depends on the governments relative military
strength:
G  g  
X
i2f;;g
Iiri for g 2 fgW ; gSg;
where Ii is an indicator which takes the value zero if player i acquiesces or has fought
but lost the war (i.e., Ii = 0 for is acquiesceor loss), while it takes the value one
if i is ghting the government or has won the war (Ii = 1 for is winor holdout).
This means that as more players challenge the government, the balance of power
shifts away from the government, but it shifts back if a player is defeated. The power
balances perfectly when G = 0.
Given the relative strength G, naturedetermines player is battle outcomes in
period t (hijt 2 fwin; hold; lossg). When two or more players are simultaneously
ghting the government in a period, they are assumed to operate the same campaign;
that is, their battle outcomes are identical probabilistic events (e.g., hjt = hjt).
Once a player initiates a war, other players infer the governments true strength
g from a series of reports from battleelds. By Bayesrule,  and s belief based on
s battles until period T can be shown as:
Pr
 
gLjHjT

=
1
1 + Pr(g
H)
Pr(gL)

Pr(holdjGS)
Pr(holdjGW )
T 1 Pr(hjT jGS)
Pr(hjT jGW )
;
where GWi (G
S
i ) is the weak (strong) governments strength relative to i, Pr(hijtjG)
is the per-period probability of hijt conditional on G, and HijT is is history (holdij1;
holdij2;    ; hijT ) with hijT 2 fwin; hold; lossg.
Given G, is per-period payo¤ from ghting can be denoted as:
i (G)  Pr (winjG)wi   Pr (lossjG) li;
while is continuation payo¤ as:
i (G) 
1X
t=1
Pr (holdjG)t 1 i (G) :
3 Assumptions
Assumptions are introduced as follows.
Assumption 1 For i; j 2 f; ; g, ri + rj < gW .
By Assumption 1, any pairwise coalition is weaker than the government for sure.
Assumption 2 (i) For i; j 2 f; ; g, Pr  winjGWi;j > 0 and Pr  winjGSi;j = 0.
(ii) Both Pr (winjG) and Pr(winjG)
Pr(win[lossjG) decrease with G until they reach zero. (iii)
Pr (holdjG) decreases with jGj : (iv) For i; j 2 f; ; g, Pr(holdjG
S
i )
Pr(holdjGWi )
=
Pr(holdjGSi;j)
Pr(holdjGWi;j)
.
By Assumption 2, (i) no pairwise coalition can defeat a strong government; (ii)
stronger players are more likely to beat the government; (iii) a battle tends to remain
indecisive if the players are as strong as the government; (iv) two playersjoint ghting
is as informative as a single players ghting.1 By Assumptions 1 and 2-(iii), any two
playersholdoutsuggests the government to be weak and thus motivates the other
player to join the rebellion.
1For instance, Assumption 2-(iv) holds for Pr (holdjG) = e ajGj b with a; b > 0.
Figure 1: A snowballing rebellion provoked by group .
Assumption 3 For i 2 f; g, (i) i
 
GS;;

< ci < i
 
GW;;

and (ii) i
 
GW;

<
ci.
By Assumption 3, (i)  and  of the full coalition are willing (unwilling) to ght
the weak (strong) government; (ii)  and  are unwilling to ght once  is defeated.
Assumption 4 (i) For i 2 f; g, Pg2fgW ;gSg Pr (g) Pr (lossjG) (i (G;;)  ci)
< 0. (ii)
P
g2fgW ;gSg Pr (g) Pr (lossjG;) ( (G;;)  c) < 0.
By Assumption 4, (i) both  and  would like to acquiesce at least once if  alone
provokes a (snowballing or catalytic) rebellion; (ii)  would like to acquiesce at least
once if  and  jointly provoke a (partially coalitional) rebellion.2
4 Four Patterns of Rebellion
We consider the following four patterns of rebellion. The rst pattern depicts the
escalation of rebellion in sequence (Figure 1).
Denition 1 A rebellion is snowballing if it is initiated solely by , followed by 
and . If  wins,  and  simultaneously ght. If  holds out for T periods,
 ghts. After s participation, if  and  win or hold out until period T
(T < T),  ghts. Otherwise,  and  acquiesce.
2To interpret Assumption 4-(i), if  ghts alone in the rst period, it will be immediately defeated
by the government with probability
P
g2fgW ;gSg Pr (g) Pr (lossjG); then, i 2 f; g will lose the
opportunity of having a payo¤ i (G;;)  ci. The assumption determines this expected payo¤ to
be negative, implying that by acquiescing once,  and  could avoid this negative payo¤ (resulting
from ghting a strong government).
The second pattern proceeds as one player ghts alone, and the two others then
act in unison.
Denition 2 A rebellion is catalytic if  initiates the ghting, and then  and 
simultaneously participate, conditional on s win or T; rounds of holdout.
Otherwise,  and  acquiesce.
The third pattern describes a rebellion that is provoked by a two-player coalition,
after which the third player may ght.
Denition 3 A rebellion is partially coalitional if it is initiated jointly by two players
 and . In this rebellion, the third player  ghts if coalition - wins or if it
holds outuntil period T. Otherwise,  acquiesces.
The last pattern takes the simplest form.
Denition 4 A rebellion is fully coalitional if all three players ght simultaneously.
5 Lagged Challenges
We solve the game by backward induction. The following lemma shows the last
challenger s rational decision.
Lemma 1 Suppose that  initiates a rebellion and  joins in after s T rounds of
holdout.(i) If T is so large thatX
g2fgW ;gSg
Pr
 
gjholdjT

Pr (lossjG;) ( (G;;)  c)  0; (1)
 is willing to ght simultaneously with  or even before . Otherwise,  continues to
acquiesce at least until T + 1: Then, (ii) after  and  win, ghts immediately,
(iii) after  and  lose,  acquiesces forever, and (iv) as long as  and  hold
out,  acquiesces until period T (T < T) and then ghts in period T + 1, where
T equals the smallest T such that Inequality (1) holds with Pr
 
gjhold;jT

instead
of Pr
 
gjholdjT

. (v) T is independent of T.
Proof. (i) With Inequality (1),  ghts immediately, given holdjT . Otherwise,
 acquiesces once, given holdjT . (ii, iii) By Assumption 2-(i),  and s win
guarantees that the government is weak. Then, s sequential rationality after  and
s win (loss) is given by Assumption 3-(i) (3-(ii)). (iv) As  and  hold out
longer, Pr
 
gW jhold;jT

converges to one by Assumptions 1 and 2-(iii), and  will
ght in some period T + 1 by Assumption 3-(i). (v) T is independent of T because
s payo¤ is independent of T by Assumption 2-(iv).
If Inequality (1) does not hold,  would ght after , escalating the rebellion as
if it snowballs (Denition 1). With Inequality (1), two possibilities emerge: if  is
willing to ght simultaneously with , the rebellion spreads catalytically (Denition
2); if  is willing to ght earlier than , we can replace  with , so that without loss
of generality, we presume that T  T. (By Assumption 4-(i), it never happens that
both  and  are willing to ght earlier than the other.)
Given s history hjT and s rational strategy,  chooses the best time to ght.
Lemma 2 Suppose that  initiates a rebellion and  adopts the strategy of Lemma 1.
(i) After s win, ghts simultaneously with . (ii) After s loss, acquiesces
forever. (iii) During s holdout, the timing of s ghting T + 1 is determined
as the smallest T + 1 such that VjT+1
 
holdjT jT
  VjT+  holdjT jT for any
  2; where VjT+
 
holdjT jT

is s expected payo¤ from ghting in T +  with s
participation from T based on holdjT :
VjT+
 
holdjT jT
  X
g2fgW ;gSg
Pr
 
gjholdjT

Pr (win [ holdjG) 10B@ TPt=T+Pr (holdjG;)t T   (G;)
+Pr (holdjG;)T T +1 (G;;)
1CA  c:
(iv) During s holdout, ghts before  (i.e., T < T) if T satises VjT
 
holdjT 1jT

 VjT+1
 
holdjT 1jT

, or if
X
g2fgW ;gSg
Pr
 
gjholdjT 1

Pr (lossjG) ( (G;;)  c)

X
g2fgW ;gSg
Pr
 
gjholdjT 1

( (G;;)   (G;)  Pr (holdjG;) (G;;)) :(2)
Proof. (i, ii) Group s decision after s win (loss) is given by Assumption
3-(i) (3-(ii)). (iii) To determine T,  compares its expected payo¤s from ghting in
all future periods (T +  for any   2). (Unlike , s incentive to ght does not
monotonically increase owing to s lagged ghting at T + 1.) (iv) Inequality (2)
checks s incentive at T. If it holds,  ghts at T instead of at T + 1, or T < T:
When determining the time to ght,  confronts a dilemma as  delays ghting,
 becomes more likely to be defeated (shown in the LHS of Inequality (2)), but s
support will be introduced sooner (in the RHS). When the former incentive outweighs
the latter,  joins s rebellion.
6 Initial Challenge and Coalition
Taking into account  and s strategies in Lemmas 1 and 2,  decides whether to
provoke a rebellion.
Proposition 1 A snowballing rebellion can break out if all playersstrategies in De-
nition 1 are incentive compatible in the sense that for T of Lemma 1 and T of Lemma
2, (i) Inequality (1) does not hold, (ii) Inequality (2) holds, and (iii) V Snj1 (T; T)  0,
where V Snj1 (T; T) is s expected payo¤ from a snowballing rebellion in Denition 1:
V Snj1 (T; T) 
X
g2fgW ;gSg
Pr (g)
0BBBBB@
TP
t=1
Pr (holdjG)t 1  (G) + Pr (holdjG)T0B@
TP
t=T+1
Pr (holdjG;)t T 1  (G;)
+Pr (holdjG;)T T  (G;;)
1CA
1CCCCCA  c:
Proof. We check the incentive compatibility for each player. (i) For , given T, 
chooses T such that T < T if Inequality (1) does not hold. (ii) For , given T,
 chooses T such that T < T if Inequality (2) holds. In addition,  acquiesces at
least once (Assumption 4-(i)). (iii) The rebellion assumes a snowballing pattern if
it is initiated by , or if V Snj1 (T; T)  0. If  wins, and  immediately ght
(Assumptions 2-(i) and 3-(i)). If  loses,they never ght (Assumption 3-(ii)).
Proposition 1 suggests that sequential spreading of rebel movements is most likely
when the three players are heterogeneous in terms of strength and resolve: the rst
player leads the rebellion; then, the second overpowers the third. For instance, in
period one, while  is willing to ght, the others are not (Assumption 4-(i)); then, in
period T + 1, while  is willing to ght,  is not (Inequality (2) holds, but not (1)).
These time lags in ghting stem from the di¤erences in parameters ri, wi, li, and ci.
A catalytic rebellion may take place when one player is signicantly stronger,
while the other two have similar propensities for ghting.
Proposition 2 A catalytic rebellion can break out if (i) T of Lemma 1 equals T
of Lemma 2 (so that Inequality (1) holds, while Inequality (2) does not), and (ii)
V Caj1 (T;)  0, as dened with T;  T = T, where V Caj1 (T;) is s expected
payo¤ from a catalytic rebellion in Denition 2:
V Caj1 (T;) 
X
g2fgW ;gSg
Pr (g)
0B@ T;Pt=1 Pr (holdjG)t 1  (G)
+Pr (holdjG)T;  (G;;)
1CA  c:
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we check each playersincentive. (i) During
s holdout, and  ght simultaneously if T = T, which requires that Inequality
(1) holds, while Inequality (2) does not. In addition, they acquiesce at least once
(Assumption 4-(i)). (ii) For , the outbreak of the catalytic rebellion requires that
V Caj1 (T;)  0.
Proposition 2 suggests that when  provokes the rebellion,  and  are unwilling
to take up arms even jointly with others (Assumption 4-(i)). However, as the rebel-
lion evolves, they update their evaluation of the governments strength, so that they
convince themselves that the challenge is worthwhile if the other also rebels (Assump-
tion 3-(i)). Then they face the coordination dilemma. After a certain length T; of
s battles, joint challenges by  and  in any period T + 1 can constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium as long as V Caj1 (T jT  T;)  0.
A partial coalition is sought by a pair of players who are unwilling to rebel on
their own, but who are willing to jointly challenge the government.
Proposition 3 A partially coalitional rebellion can break out if T and T of Lemmas
1 and 2 are such that (i) no player is willing to ght alone (V Snj1 (T; T)  0 for
T < T; V Caj1 (T;)  0 for T;  T = T), but (ii) two players  and  have
su¢ cient resolve that min
n
V Paj1 (T) ; V
Pa
j1 (T)
o
 0; where V Paij1 (T) for i 2 f; g
is is expected payo¤ from a partially coalitional rebellion, as given in Denition 3:
V Paij1 (T) 
X
g2fgW ;gSg
Pr (g)
0B@ TPt=1Pr (holdjG;)t 1 i (G;)
+Pr (holdjG;)T i (G;;)
1CA  ci:
Proof. Players  and , but not , are willing to jointly ght because (i) a rebellion
is impossible without a coalition, and (ii) for  and , the partially coordinated
rebellion is preferred to permanent acquiesce.On the other hand,  is willing to
acquiesce at least once (Assumption 4-(ii)). If  and  win, ghts immediately
(Assumptions 2-(i) and 3-(i)). If they lose, never ghts (Assumption 3-(ii)).
Full coordination is most likely when power is distributed equally across the three
players in the sense that no sole player or partial coalition is willing to ght.
Proposition 4 A fully coalitional rebellion can break out if T and T of Lemmas
1 and 2 are such that (i) no player is willing to ght alone (V Snj1 (T; T)  0 for
T < T; V Caj1 (T;)  0 for T;  T = T), (ii) no pair of players are will-
ing to ght (min
n
V Paj1 (T) ; V
Pa
j1 (T)
o
 0), but (iii) all three players have su¢ -
cient resolve to collectively ght the government with unknown strength such that
min

V Fu ; V
Fu
 ; V
Fu

	  0, where V Fui for i 2 f; ; g is is expected payo¤ from a
fully coalitional rebellion, as given in Denition 4:
V Fui 
X
g2fgW ;gSg
Pr (g)i (G;;)  ci:
Proof. The three players are willing to challenge concurrently because (i, ii) no other
form of rebellion is incentive compatible, but (iii) they all prefer the fully coalitional
rebellion to permanent acquiesce.
If ther are more than three players, even more complicated patterns may emerge,
but they still fall into some combination of these four patterns.
7 Numerical Example
A snowballing rebellion emerges with the following parameter values: w = w = 12;
w = 8; l = l = l = 3; c = c = c = 1; r = 4; r = r = 3; g
L = 8; gH = 12;
Pr
 
gL

= Pr
 
gH

= 1
2
; Pr (holdjG) = 99
100
exp

  jGj
100

; and Pr (winjG 2 [0; 5)) =
Pr (lossjG 2 ( 5; 0)) = 1
200
exp

  jGj
2

. In this equilibrium,  provokes the rebellion,
 joins in at T = 10 (with probability 0:509), and  follows at T = 15 (with
probability 0:428). If  is as bellicose as  when w = 8 (instead of 12),  and  ght
simultaneously at T;  15, constituting a catalytic rebellion.
8 Conclusion
This study contributes to the theoretical literature on war. Although multilateral war
is di¢ cult to theorize (Jackson and Morelli 2011), recent studies have modeled it by
simplifying some of its aspects (Krainin and Wiseman 2016). Echoing this theoretical
trend, we have formally analyzed a class of war fought between a hegemon and three
challengers in order to demonstrate that a rebellion can break out and expand in one
of the four patterns. Further theoretical studies of multilateral war are expected.
References
[1] Angeletos, George-Marios, Christian Hellwig, and Alessandro Pavan. 2007. Dy-
namic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing
of Attacks.Econometrica. 75(3): 711-756.
[2] Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2010. Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepre-
neurs.American Political Science Review. 104(3): 446-466.
[3] Fearon, James D. 2011. Self-Enforcing Democracy.Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics. 126(4): 1661-1708.
[4] Ginkel, John, and Alastair Smith. 1999.  So You Say You Want a Revolution: A
Game Theoretic Explanation of Revolution in Representative Regimes.Journal
of Conict Resolution. 43(3): 291-316.
[5] Granovetter, Mark. 1978. Threshold Model of Collective Behavior.American
Journal of Sociology. 83(6): 1420-1443.
[6] Jackson, Matthew O., and Massimio Morelli. 2011. The Reasons for Wars -
an Updated Survey.In: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers, eds. The
Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Northampton, MA: Elgar Publish-
ing, 34-57.
[7] Krainin, Colin, and Thomas Wiseman. 2016. War and Stability in Dynamic
International Systems.Journal of Politics. 78(4): 1139-1152.
[8] Nakao, Keisuke. 2015. Expansion of Rebellion: From Periphery to Heartland.
Journal of Peace Research. 52(5): 591-606.
[9] Roemer, John E. 1985. Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology.Econometrica.
53(1): 85-108.
[10] Weingast, Barry R. 1995. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development.Journal of Law, Economics,
& Organization. 11(1): 1-31.
[11] Weingast, Barry R. 1997. The Political Foundation of Democracy and the Rule
of Law.American Political Science Review. 91(2): 245-263.
[12] Weingast, Barry R. 2005. The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty.
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 19(3): 89-108.
